Two experiments tested the absolute sleeper effect predicted by the discounting cue hypothesis. These experiments included strong tests of the hypothesis because 'they (a) demonstrably created the conditions that the theory indicated were necessary for the effect to occur; (b) demonstrably minimized the impact of a force known to countervail against the effect; and (c) employed statistical tests that had adequate power to detect the effect should it occur. In Experiment 1, subjects read one of two persuasive messages accompanied by a discounting cue. All the requirements for a strong test were demonstrably met with one message, and an absolute sleeper effect was obtained when attitudes were measured again after 5 weeks. Not all the requirements for a strong test were met with the other message, and the effect was not obtained. In Experiment 2, subjects read a persuasive message and one of five discounting cues. All the requirements for a strong test were demonstrably met in three cue conditions, and absolute sleeper effects were found in each of them after 6 weeks. Absolute sleeper effects were not observed in the two cue conditions in which the necessary conditions for the effect were not met. It was concluded that absolute sleeper effects can be reliably obtained when all the necessary theoretical conditions are met, a known countervailing force is absent, and the statistical tests have adequate power.
needed to produce a sleeper effect.
When subjects receive an effective persuasive message, their attitudes change in the direction of the message conclusion. Discounting refers to the suppression of this initial attitude change, and it occurs when the message conclusion is paired with information that causes subjects not to accept the message conclusion to the extent they would if they received the message alone. Dissociation refers to the spontaneous breakdown of the pairing between the message conclusion and the discounting cue. According to the discounting cue hypothesis, the message and discounting cue are supposed to become spontaneously dissociated over time, and attitudes after dissociation are supposed to depend on whatever residual impact the message has at the time of dissociation. A sleeper effect is supposed to result whenever the residual impact that the message has at the time of dissociation is greater than the initial impact it has when it is paired with the discounting cue.
The past literature contains no extended discussions of how a discounting cue should be denned. However, the discounting cue hypothesis presumes a passive model of pairedassociate learning and does not explicitly suggest that the discounting cue should affect how a persuasive message is encoded. Consequently, we understand a discounting cue to be any brief signal which indicates that the information in an otherwise persuasive message is not credible, and this cue operates by causing subjects to dismiss the message conclusion in summary fashion rather than by having them process the message in unique ways that convince them of its untenability. It is possible to imagine cues that cause a message to be discounted and that also affect how the message content is processed. But though such cues may also cause sleeper Karen M. Hennigan is now at the University of Southern California; Brian Flay, at the University of Waterloo; Cynthia Alessis, at DePaul University; and Jerome Halamaj, at the University of Minnesota.
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effects, it would not be clear whether such effects were solely mediated by the simple associative processes underlying the discounting cue hypothesis or whether they were mediated by other processes or by the discounting cue hypothesis in conjunction with other processes. Speculative issues such as these can only be resolved after more conceptual and empirical work is done on classifying types of discounting cue and on testing whether different kinds of cue have different consequences for the temporal persistence of attitude change. have reviewed the many data-based claims that sleeper effects exist. However, doubt has recently been raised about whether these past claims were justified (Gillig & Greenwald, 1974; Cook, Note 1) . The doubt can in part be traced to past failures to distinguish between absolute and relative sleeper effects. An absolute sleeper effect occurs when attitude change increases reliably over time in a discounting cue group compared to the corresponding temporal change in a no-message control group. While this operational definition corresponds to the original conceptual definition of a sleeper effect (Hovland et al., 1949) , it has rarely been used in past tests of the sleeper effect. The most frequently used operational definition of the sleeper effect might be called a relative sleeper effect. Such an effect is inferred when attitude change increases more, or decays less, over time in a discounting cue group than in some other group that reads the same persuasive message.
Absolute Versus Relative Sleeper Effects
Many studies in the literature used low source credibility as a discounting cue and reported statistically significant interactions of source credibility and time of attitude measurement. These interactions formed the basis of past claims about the robustness of the sleeper effect predicted from the discounting cue hypothesis. However, such interactions test relative sleeper effects. Moreover, they capitalize upon the theoretical irrelevancies that (a) the immediate attitude change caused by persuasive messages typically decays over time and (b) more decay of change is expected the greater is the immediate attitude change . These facts suggest that a relative sleeper effect could occur simply because immediate attitude change is greater in a high-than in a low-credibility discounting cue group, and the greater initial change would be expected to decay more rapidly. This could happen regardless of whether the low-credibility source initially caused discounting of the message conclusion and later became dissociated from the message. In other words, relative sleeper effects do not necessarily result from the processes of discounting and dissociation. Furthermore, statistically reliable relative sleeper effects can result when there is a decrease, no change, or a trivial increase in attitude change over time in a discounting cue group. But such effects are not consistent with the conceptual definition of a sleeper effect, which calls for a reliable increase in attitude change over time in a discounting cue group.
Using the Null Hypothesis to Infer That the Absolute Sleeper Does Not Exist
Only the absolute sleeper effect corresponds to the conceptual definition of the sleeper effect that is predicted from the discounting cue hypothesis. Unfortunately, a review of past experiments revealed little evidence that absolute sleeper effects had ever occurred following a discounting cue (Cook, Note 1) . On the basis of this lack of evidence and their own failure to find the effect in seven attempts, Gillig and Greenwald (1974) favored accepting the null hypothesis and suggested that the sleeper effect should be "laid to rest." There are at least two reasons, however, why it would be premature to accept this conclusion. First, the discounting cue hypothesis is based on a paired-associate model of attitude change that has successfully guided much research on immediate attitude change (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 19S3; McGuire, 1969) , and some of its implications for the persistence of attitude change (other than the sleeper effect) have been directly tested and empirically corroborated (Kelman & Hovland, 19S3; Weber, 1972) . Second, a "strong test" is required before no difference findings can be used for accepting the null hypothesis (i.e., "There is no sleeper effect") as opposed to not rejecting it (i.e., "We failed to find a sleeper effect"). A strong test requires (a) that the theory from which the phenomenon was derived be explicated and the necessary conditions for the effect to occur be identified; (b) that all the plausible countervailing forces (or suppressor variables) be identified and accounted for; and (c) that the statistical analyses used to test for the effect be demonstrated to have sufficient power to detect the effect if it does occur. Reviews of past studies suggest that no experiments met all three of these requirements and that therefore no strong tests of the sleeper effect have been conducted to date (Cook, Note 1; Cook, Gruder, Hennigan, & Flay, Note 2) .
How Can Strong Tests of the Absolute Sleeper Effect Be Conducted?
In order to conduct a strong test, the first step is to identify the necessary theoretical conditions for the effect to occur. The discounting cue hypothesis predicts that an absolute sleeper effect will occur if and only if four conditions are met: First, the message must have a significant initial impact on attitudes; second, the discounting cue must be powerful enough to significantly inhibit the attitude change that the message would otherwise have caused; third, the discounting cue and message must become dissociated before delayed measurement takes place; and fourth, the level of attitude in a message-only group at the time of delayed measurement must be higher than the level that is found in the discounting cue group immediately after exposure to the message. The fourth condition defines the maximum distance that attitudes in the discounting cue group can increase over time, because the hypothesis predicts that those attitudes will rise to the postdissociation level found in a message-only group. Meeting this condition will be facilitated (a) if the initial attitude change in the message-only group decays slowly and (b) if the discounting cue dissociates rapidly from the message.
Meeting To obtain high SER values would be of little use if known countervailing forces were operating to suppress an absolute sleeper effect. It has been empirically established (a) that in most past experiments with discounting cues, the cues have inhibited initial attitude change but have not entirely suppressed it (Cook et al., Note 2) and (b) that initial attitude change typically decays with time . Thus, whenever a discounted message causes some initial attitude change, it is likely that a temporal decay force will be set up that countervails against an absolute sleeper effect. Consequently, a sleeper effect should be most likely to occur when there is no initial attitude change.
The purpose of this article is to report strong experimental tests of the absolute sleeper effect that is predicted by the discounting cue hypothesis. Pilot testing was used (a) to develop messages that produced a high level of initial attitude change and (b) to design discounting cues that were likely to suppress all initial attitude change. We deliberately chose longer delay intervals than in most past studies so as to increase the chances that dissociation would occur prior to delayed attitude measurement. In Experiment 1, we did not measure dissociation directly, but in Experiment 2, we did so and demonstrated that it had, in fact, occurred. The overall design of each experiment was similar. Each included discounting cue groups, a messageonly group, and a no-message group. In Experiment 1, a single discounting cue was paired with two different messages, while in Experiment 2, five kinds of discounting cue were paired with a single message. In Experiment 1, attitudes were measured immediately after exposure to a persuasive message and cue and again 5 weeks later. To assess the effects of repeated attitude measurement, half the subjects in Experiment 2 were measured immediately after the message and again after a 6-week delay, while the other half were measured only after the 6-week delay.
Method

Experiment 1
Subjects. Subjects were 161 students from introductory psychology courses who participated to fulfill part of a course requirement. They signed up for two separate 1-hour experiments on "information processing." These were actually the immediate and delayed posttest sessions. One hundred forty subjects (87%) returned for the second session. The percentage of nonreturnees was not related to experimental conditions, and the attitudes of returnees and nonreturnees did not differ in any condition at the immediate posttest. Thus, it is unlikely that there are any attrition artifacts in the data to be reported.
Procedure. For the first session, up to 10 subjects reported each hour to the psychology laboratories, where a male experimenter seated them in separate cubicles. He introduced the "Verbal Information Processing Experiment" as part of a larger project that involved unrelated experiments on different kinds of information processing. Then he gave each subject a booklet from a pile that had been arranged so that subjects would be randomly assigned to experimental groups. Subjects were instructed to read the message in the booklet twice, once focusing on what was said (content) and once on how it was Baid (style). The purpose of this maneuver was to increase the initial impact of the persuasive message. For the appropriate experimental groups, a discounting cue manipulation came after the message. In all booklets, the attitude measures appeared next. The booklets ended with a series of items on the organization of the message content and the author's writing style that were designed to validate the cover story.
Several precautions were taken to keep the contextual cues of the two sessions different so that the first session would be reinstated as little as possible at the second. Subjects reported to a different laboratory (not in the psychology department) for the second session, where they were initially greeted by a receptionist (rather than an experimenter) who directed them to a large room arranged with rows of tables and chairs (rather than individual cubicles). The ostensible purpose of the "second experiment" was to study "visual information processing," and to make this purpose credible and salient, a videotape recorder/playback unit and a television monitor were prominently displayed at the front of the room. The session was conducted either by a male or a female experimenter who was different from the experimenter at the first session.
The experimenter at the second session described the experiment as "concerned with the ways in which we use information that we receive through the visual modality." To make the collection of attitude data seem reasonable in this visual experiment, the experimenter added that the focus was on "how such information is related to our cognitionsour thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and so forth." Subjects were asked to complete an attitude inventory in which the critical items were embedded at random.
Design. The design of the experiment was a 3X2 factorial in which subjects were randomly assigned to experimental or control groups (no message, message only, and message plus discounting cue), and their attitude was measured twice (immediately after reading a persuasive message and again 5 weeks later). This design was replicated with two message topics. Subjects in the message-only and discounting cue groups for one message served as the no-message controls for the other. All subjects' attitudes toward both topics were assessed, though each subject read only one message. Thus, for any one message there were twice as many subjects in the no-message group as in the message-only or discounting cue groups.
Messages and cue. One of the two messages was approximately 1,000 words long and was titled "The Four-Day Work Week: No Answer to Employee Dissatisfaction." It presented arguments supporting the belief that "despite its innovative nature and claimed successes, the four-day work week produces more problems for the worker than it solves, and thus, is doomed because it will decrease rather than increase worker satisfaction." The second message was shorter -about 650 words. It was titled "Right Turn on Red Reconsidered" and argued against a recently enacted state law allowing motorists to make right turns on red lights at most intersections.
The discounting cue manipulation consisted of a "Note to the Reader" following the message in which the conclusion of the message was restated and labeled as false. Moreover, the message was said to have been refuted because it was inaccurate and wrong.
Attitude measurement. Attitude toward each issue was assessed by having subjects respond to 6 attitude items, half of which were positively worded and half negatively. At the immediate posttest, the 12 critical attitude items were presented together with 18 items on 3 unrelated issues, while at the delayed posttest, the items were presented in a different order and were interspersed among 42 other items.
The response scale at each posttest was the 20 signed digits between -10 and +10 (omitting 0). Four labels were provided for this scale: -10 = disagree very strongly; -1 = disagree slightly; +1 = agree slightly; and +10 = agree very strongly. Each subject's responses were summed over the 6 items to produce an attitude index with a possible range of -60 (least favorable to the advocated position) to +60 (most favorable).
Results
Were the conditions met for a strong test oj the absolute sleeper effect? The first condition for a strong test is that there should be significant attitude change in the messageonly group. This was true for both the 4-day message (message only M = 22.31, SD = 21.27; no message M = -5.53, SD = 22.41), t(lQQ) = 6.03, p < .001, and the right turn message (message only M=-7.51, SD = 35.17; no message M = -32.39, SD -26.60), £(103) =3.69, />< .001. Another condition for a strong test is that there be no initial attitude change in the discounting cue group. For the 4-day message there was no statistically significant difference between the no-message group SD = 22.41) and the discounting cue group (M = -5.47, SD -26.86; t < 1). This was less clearly the case for the right turn message, since the no-mesage group (M = -32.39, SD = 26.60) and the discounting cue group (M = -22.51, SD = 34.62) tended to differ, /(108) = 1.62, p < .11. This marginal change suggests that an attitude decay force may have been set up for the right turn message that would countervail against an absolute sleeper effect.
Strong tests of the absolute sleeper effect also require that message-cue dissociation occur. We tried to increase the probability that dissociation would occur by using longer delay intervals than had been used in past studies. There were no direct measures of dissociation in Experiment 1, but when direct measures were made in Experiment 2 (for a highly similar version of the 4-day message and cue), dissociation was shown to have occurred. If we assume for the moment that dissociation had occurred, it is appropriate to examine SER in each case. For the 4-day message, the SER value was 2.65, and for the right turn message it was 1.03. Comparing SER with the t value and df needed to demonstrate a significant sleeper effect, these values indicate that only for the 4-day message was there sufficient room for an increase in attitude change to be statistically corroborated in the discounting cue group.
In sum, all the evidence we have suggests that the 4-day message provides a strong test of the absolute sleeper effect and that the right turn message probably does not.
Was there an absolute sleeper effect? Figure 1 shows that there appears to have been an absolute sleeper effect for the 4-day message, but not for the right turn message. To assess the statistical reliability of the apparent sleeper effect for the 4-day message, the difference between the immediate and delayed attitude means in the discounting cue The foregoing test for the 4-day message may have capitalized upon the statistically trivial absolute decay of attitude change in the no-message group and upon the somewhat lower variance and the larger sample size in that group when compared to the discounting cue group. Thus, a second and more conservative test of the absolute sleeper effect was conducted, which showed that the immediate and delayed means tended to differ within the discounting cue group, f(37) = 1.99, p < .10.
Discussion
All the conditions for a strong test of the absolute sleeper effect were probably met in the discounting cue group that read the 4-day message, and a statistically significant absolute sleeper effect resulted. Not all the conditions for a strong test were met with the right turn message, and no sleeper effect was observed. Thus, our failure to obtain the effect where it was not expected provides a serendipitous assessment of discriminant validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) when juxtaposed against our obtaining the effect where it was expected.
Logically, the absolute sleeper effect we obtained can only be attributed to the processes of initial discounting and subsequent dissociation after all plausible alternative interpretations have been ruled out. One such interpretation points to the large number of previous unsuccessful attempts to find an absolute sleeper effect and suggests that the present effect may be due to chance. Obviously, a second experiment is required to rule out this possibility.
A second alternative explanation is based on demand characteristics (Orne, 1962) . In Experiment 1, the discounting cue was a "Note to the Reader" stating that the conclusion of the message was false. This note immediately preceded the measurement of attitude and, since no other source was mentioned, subjects may have thought the note came from the experimenter. If so, they may have thought that the experimenter wanted them to report that their attitude had not changed, making their initial responses a reflection of compliance rather than the internalized rejection of an influential message. Since the attitudes subjects reported at the delayed session were much less likely to be influenced by demands, the sleeper effect might have been due to the presence of demand characteristics at the immediate measurement and their absence at the delayed measurement. This explanation loses plausibility because subjects who read the right turn message did not react similarly and show a sleeper effect. The demand characteristics interpretation would be even less plausible if a second experiment were conducted in which the discounting cue came from a source other than the experimenter.
Experiment 2 was also conducted to see if an absolute sleeper effect could be obtained with qualitatively different kinds of discounting cues. To this end, we used two methods for causing subjects to discount the message. One led subjects to reject the message conclusion because the information in the message was not credible, and the other led subjects to reject the message conclusions because psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966) was aroused. Another dimension we explored was whether a sleeper effect could be obtained when attitude was measured on different groups of subjects at each time interval as opposed to being measured on the same subjects at different times. Consequently, we manipulated whether time of measurement was a between-subjects or a within-subjects variable. A final goal of Experiment 2 was to measure dissociation directly, rather than having to rely on proxies in order to make assumptions about whether dissociation had occurred by the final delay interval.
Experiment 2 Method
Subjects. Subjects were 493 introductory psychology students who signed up to participate in a one-session "Information-Processing Experiment." Four hundred and fifteen subjects (84%) were successfully contacted in their homes by telephone 6 GRUDER ET AL.
weeks later for the delayed attitude measurement in a context that made no mention of psychology or the experiment. Again, attrition was not related to experimental condition.
Procedure. Subjects reported to the laboratory in groups of 20 or less. They were randomly assigned to conditions as in Experiment 1. The booklets contained instructions, the message, a discounting cue where appropriate, manipulation checks, items that substantiated the cover story, and 20 attitude items which, for half the subjects, included the 6 critical items.
Subjects were instructed to read each paragraph of the message twice, underlining the main point of each paragraph as they read. To maintain the cover story, they were told to gain a general impression of the content the first time they read a paragraph and to concentrate on its style the second time. This insured that they would learn the main points before reading any discounting cue, and it decreased the possibility that subjects might encode the message differently from subjects who read it but did not receive a discounting cue. Further, since discounting cues cause greater discounting when they follow a message than when they precede it (Weber, 1971) , a cue that follows a message is more likely to suppress all initial attitude change.
Approximately 6 weeks later, subjects were contacted by telephone by the "University Survey Institute," which was ostensibly conducting a survey of student attitudes toward issues of current interest. The telephone interviewers began by asking subjects to respond to 24 attitude items, among which the same 6 items used in the first session were randomly embedded. Subjects were then interviewed to determine (a) the extent to which the message was associated with any discounting cue and (b) their recall of the discounting cue (if they had one). The interviewers were not aware of the subject's experimental condition when attitudes and message-cue association were measured. However, it became necessary for the interviewer to learn the subject's condition at the end of the interview in order to ask directly about recall of the particular discounting cue read 6 weeks earlier.
Design. The design involved five discounting cue groups and a message-only group that all read the same experimental message and a no-message group that read an irrelevant message. In each of these seven groups, the attitudes of a random half of the subjects were measured twice, once immediately after reading the message and again 6 weeks later, creating a repeated measures design as in Experiment 1. The other half were measured only once, after 6 weeks, thereby permitting an estimate of the effects of repeatedly measuring attitudes.
Messages and cues. The messages were first professionally printed and then photocopied to look as if they had been reproduced from a magazine. The message used in the message-only and discounting cue conditions was the same 4-day work week essay of Experiment 1, but it was edited to sharpen the persuasive arguments presented within each paragraph. The no-message group read an unrelated message of comparable length.
Two strategies were used to operationalize discounting cues and to minimize demand characteristics. In one strategy, the discounting cue was presented as a "Note from the Editor" following the article, as opposed to the "Note to the Reader" in Experiment 1. There were two versions of this cue. One declared the message conclusion to be false without restating it (called Low Credibility Level 1). The second was worded almost identically to the discounting cue used in Experiment 1: The conclusion of the message was restated and was declared to be false (called Low Credibility Level 2). The message-only group also had a "Note from the Editor"-it was neutral and was not intended to cause discounting.
The second strategy used to operationalize a discounting cue was to alter the concluding paragraph of the message so that it would arouse reactance. Thus, for some randomly selected subjects, the last paragraph of the message included the phrases "any intelligent person has no choice but to believe" and "you must inevitably conclude." We hoped that presenting the message conclusion in the context of these phrases would be experienced by subjects as an effort by the author to try to force them to accept his conclusion, and that subjects would attempt to re-establish their freedom by rejecting the author's conclusion, that is, by discounting his message (Brehm, 1966) . This manipulation was called Reactance Only.
In addition to the three discounting cues just described, we created two more by combining the reactance cue separately with the Low Credibility Level 1 and Low Credibility Level 2 cues. We thus had five manipulations of a discounting cue-Low Credibility Level 1, Low Credibility Level 2, Reactance Only, Reactance + Low Credibility Level 1, and Reactance + Low Credibility Level 2.
Measures. The effectiveness of the discounting cue manipulations was assessed using ratings on 10 bipolar items (e.g., accurate-inaccurate, true-false, of high credibility -of low credibility). Those subjects whose attitudes were measured immediately after reading the message rated each item on 7-point scales. These ratings were added to create an index that ranged from 10 to 70, with higher scores indicating greater discounting.
Attitudes were measured with six items, three worded in favor of the message and three against. The 20-point response scale for each item used in Experiment 1 was expanded by the addition of a "0" response to indicate neutral feelings. Responses to the six items were summed to create an attitude index that ranged from -60 to +60. The same attitude items and scales were used at both the immediate and delayed posttests, though the context and filler items were different.
Immediately after delayed attitude measurement, dissociation was assessed using a "funnel" interview (cf. Page, 1973 ) that started with general questions to allow subjects to mention the message-cue associ-ation spontaneously before any specific questions were asked. The interviewers justified their questions by claiming to be interested in learning what information students use in forming their opinions. Subjects were questioned a'bout the sources of their information on the 4-day issue, which they believed had been randomly selected for them. The interview started with questions of a very general nature, which did not refer to the experiment, the message, or any discounting cue (e.g., "Have you read any articles about the four-day work week at school in the last few months?") and progressed to items that asked about the message and its conclusions (e.g., "We are interested in everything you can remember about what you read. What do you remember?"). If, by this time, subjects had not spontaneously mentioned any discounting cue, the interviewer went on to ask questions that indirectly probed message-cue association (e.g., "Do you think the article was biased? Did anything make you skeptical about believing the article?"). If subjects still had not mentioned any discounting cue, the interviewer asked directly about message-cue association and recall of the particular discounting cue they had read 6 weeks earlier (e.g., for the discounting cue: "Was there a note from the editor at the end of the article? Was there any reason to believe that the conclusion of the article might have been false?" For the reactance cue: "Was there anything unusual about the way the author summed up the article? Did the author try to force you to accept his conclusion?"). This progression of items was designed (a) to determine whether subjects spontaneously associated a discounting cue with the message, and if they did not, (b) to determine how much probing was necessary to elicit recall of the cue, if it was recalled at all.
Two independent raters coded the responses on a S-point scale of "dissociation" according to the amount of probing necessary for each of the two types of discounting cue manipulations (low credibility and reactance). The raters disagreed on only 1% of the protocols, and a third independent rater resolved these disagreements. Because the results were highly skewed, with most subjects completely dissociating or forgetting the cue, the measure was reduced to three categories. Those subjects who could not recall the cue, even with direct probing, were scored as having completely dissociated the message and cue. Those who mentioned the cue with little or no probing were scored as having not dissociated. Subjects in an intermediate category mentioned the cue only after direct probing, so it is unclear whether they had dissociated the message and cue.
Results and Discussion
Did the discounting cues operate as intended? The index designed to check whether the discounting cue manipulations in fact caused subjects to discount the message was analyzed in a series of planned comparisons. Each of the five discounting cue groups was compared to the message-only group (M = 29.59, SD -9.51). Subjects in each of the five discounting cue groups discounted the message more than subjects in the messageonly group: Low Credibility Level 1: M = 35.32, SD -11.01, i (121) Were there effects of repeated measurement? In order to assess whether repeated measurement affected the delayed posttest scores, a 7 X 2 Groups (experimental groups) X Measurement (repeated vs. not repeated) analysis of variance was conducted on the delayed attitude scores. There was no main effect or interaction of measurement on attitude in this analysis (both Fs < 1). Moreover, there was no significant effect of measurement within any experimental group. Hence, we proceeded on the assumption that there were no effects of repeated measurement.
Were the conditions met for a strong test of the absolute sleeper effect?
A strong test requires that the persuasive message produce initial attitude change. A comparison of immediate posttest attitudes in the messageonly group with attitudes in the no-message group revealed that the message did indeed change attitude (message only: M = 17.79Ŝ D -27.16; no message: M = -4.17, SD = 22.20), *(60) = 3.36,-#< .01.
A strong test also requires that a discounting cue suppress all initial attitude change. Comparisons of immediate attitude in each of the cue groups with immediate attitude in the no-message group revealed no statistically significant changes in three instances-Low Credibility Level 2, Reactance + Low Credibility Level 1, and Reactance + Low Credibility Level 2 (all is < 1). However, in the two remaining instances, attitude change was not entirely suppressed. The Low Credibility Level 1 group showed significantly more initial change than the no-message group, £(61) It is also necessary that the message and cue be dissociated by the time of the delayed posttest. The percentage of subjects in each cue group who dissociated the cue and the message after 6 weeks is presented in Table I . 2 In each group, over 75% of the subjects completely dissociated the low-credibility cue, and over 91% completely dissociated the reactance cue. It is important to note that spontaneous association of either cue was rare-in every case it was 6% or less.
The remaining conditions for a strong test are conveniently summarized by SER. The basic question is whether there is sufficient room for attitude in the discounting cue groups to increase significantly over time given the level of error variance. In order to determine this, values of SER were computed for each group and were compared with the t value that must be reached in order to demonstrate a significant absolute sleeper effect. There was sufficient room in Reactance + Low Credibility Level 1, SER -1.97, using £(80), p < .06, and in Reactance + Low Credibility Level 2, SER = 2.52, using t(90), p < .02. An SER of 1.50 suggested that there probably was not enough room for significant attitude change to occur in Low Credibility Level 2, using *(87), p < .20. The SER was clearly not large enough in the Low Credibility Level 1 and the Reactance Only groups (bothSE/?s< 1).
In conclusion, the strongest tests of the absolute sleeper effect predicted from the discounting cue hypothesis were in the Reactance + Low Credibility Level 1 and Reactance + Low Credibility Level 2 groups. In each of these cases, initial attitude change was suppressed, the message and discounting cue(s) were dissociated by the 6-week posttest, and there was sufficient residual impact of the persuasive message at the posttest so that the level of attitude in the discounting cue groups could show a statistically significant increase. The first two of these conditions prevailed in the Low Credibility Level 2 group, but the third probably did not, thus providing the conditions for a weaker test of the sleeper effect in that group. Indications were that the other two cue groups failed to meet the conditions for a strong test.
Was there an absolute sleeper effect? Evi-dence for an absolute sleeper effect is a statistically significant interaction of experimental group (discounting cue vs. no message) and time of measurement (immediate vs. 6-week delay). Thus, separate 2x2 analyses of variance were conducted for each discounting cue group. Since there were no effects of repeated measurement, the first analysis treated the data from all the subjects as coming from a single between-subjects design ignoring the fact that some subjects were measured twice. 3 The interactions are shown in Figure 2 and the relevant means and F values in Table 2 . Statistically significant sleeper effects occurred in the two discounting cue groups in which they were confidently predicted (Reactance + Low Credibility Level 1 and Reactance + Low Credibility Level 2), the effect was not statistically significant in the group in which there was a weaker test (Low Credibility Level 2), and no statistically significant effects occurred in the two groups in which the conditions for a strong test were not met (Low Credibility Level 1 and Reactance Only).
A potentially more powerful analysis of the absolute sleeper effect could be conducted by using the data only from subjects whose attitudes were measured twice. This analysis entailed blocking on subjects' immediate attitude scores and thereby removing much of the variance due to differences between subjects.
4 Such an analysis is only appropriate, though, where there is no difference between groups on the blocking variable, which in this case was immediate posttest attitudes (Cook & Reichardt, 1976) . This test could be conducted, then, for three cue groups-Low Credibility Level 2, Reactance + Low Credibility Level 1, and Reactance + Low Credibility Level 2. It was not necessary to conduct such an analysis for the latter two groups because statistically significant absolute sleeper effects were found with the less powerful analysis; thus, the more powerful analysis was conducted only for the Low Credibility Level 2 group. Five blocks were constructed, and a 5 X 2 analysis of variance was conducted, with blocks as one factor and groups (Low Credibility Level 2 vs. no message) as the second. The dependent variable was the difference between each subject's delayed and immediate posttest attitude scores. For this analysis, SER = 4.04 (in contrast to 1.50), confirming that this constitutes a more powerful test of the absolute sleeper effect. The 3 For the record, we also conducted 2 separate analyses. One used a within-subjects error term and just the data from the repeated measure subjects, and the other used a between-subjects error term based on the immediate posttest scores of the repeated measure subjects and the delayed posttest scores of the subjects whose attitude was measured only once. The results were the same in these 2 analyses as for the combined analysis reported here, and the same substantive conclusions would be drawn. 4 The blocking analysis was chosen over covariance analysis because the within-group test-retest correlations were generally below .3, suggesting that blocking is the more powerful analysis here (Feldt, 1958; Reichardt, in press ). For the record, the same pattern of results is obtained if the less powerful covariance analysis is used. 1072 CRUDER ET AL. a Range = -60 to +60. The more positive the mean, the more the agreement with the message conclusion that the 4-day work week is disadvantageous. b Each discounting cue condition was compared separately with the no-message control condition.
analysis revealed a main effect of blocks, F(4, 49) = 12.20, p < .001, and no interaction of blocks and groups. Hence, blocking removed a significant portion of the variance due to subjects, and it did not do so differentially across groups. Most important, the analysis revealed a significant main effect of groups, F(l,49) =,6.44, p < .02, indicating an absolute sleeper effect.
General Discussion
The requirements for a strong test of the sleeper effect that is predicted from the discounting cue hypothesis were created with the 4-day work week message in Experiment 1 and with three discounting cue groups in Experiment 2; statistically reliable absolute sleeper effects were obtained in these 4 cases. The requirements for a strong test of the sleeper effect were not met with the rightturn-on-red message in Experiment 1 and with two groups in Experiment 2; no absolute sleeper effect was observed in these cases. It seems, then, that absolute sleeper effects can be reliably obtained once the necessary conditions for a strong test have been achieved.
Ruling Out Alternative Explanations
Before we can attribute these effects to the discounting and dissociation processes, we have to rule out possible alternative explanations of the findings. Chance is an implausible explanation because the absolute sleeper effect found in Experiment 1 was replicated three times in Experiment 2. Demand characteristics are also unlikely to be a valid explanation because in Experiment 2 care was taken to reduce the chance that subjects would identify the experimenter as the source of either the message or the discounting cue. It is also unlikely that the effects obtained are artifacts of repeated attitude measurement because sleeper effects were observed in Experiment 2 with samples of subjects whose attitudes were or were not measured twice. 5 In conducting this blocking analysis, we assumed that the population means at the immediate postest did not differ, because the no-message and Low Credibility Level 2 sample means were not significantly different (i<l). If this assumption is true, the test we conducted was unbiased. On the other hand, if the assumption is not true (e.g., if the population means are different but our test was not sensitive enough to detect it), then the test would be biased insofar as it would underadjust for differences on the blocking variable. Therefore, to reduce possible underadjustment bias, we conducted an alternative test blocking within groups rather than across the combined groups. The resulting Blocks X Groups (5X2) analysis of variance on the difference between the delayed and immediate posttest attitude scores yielded a statistically marginal absolute sleeper effect, F(l,49) = 2.78, p<.W. Thus, even if we assume that there was in fact a slight attitude difference at the immediate posttest, the sleeper effect tends to be corroborated in this discounting cue group. Since the discounting cue followed the message in all of our discounting cue conditions, it could be argued that an absolute sleeper effect only occurs when the cue follows the message. While most past studies reviewed by Cook et al. (Note 2) presented the discounting cue before the message, some did present it after (e.g., Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Weber, 1971; Weiss, 1953) . Absolute sleeper effects did not emerge, however, with either order. Consequently, it is clear that a discounting cue following a message is not a sufficient condition for an absolute sleeper effect to occur, although this order of presentation may facilitate obtaining the effect when all the necessary theoretical conditions are met, a known countervailing force is ruled out, and statistical tests of sufficient power to detect the effect, should it occur, are employed. In any case, order of message-cue presentation is not a rival explanation of our findings, although subsequent research may limit the sleeper effect's external validity by showing that it is only obtained when the cue follows the message.
The discounting cue hypothesis specifies that attitude in a discounting cue group should rise to the level that still remains in a message-only group at the time of dissociation. The hypothesis cannot therefore explain a data pattern in which delayed attitude in a discounting cue group reveals more change than in a message-only group. Inspection of Figure 2 reveals such apparent crossover effects in the Reactance Only and the Reactance + Low Credibility Level 1 groups. In each case, the delayed attitude mean tended to be higher than the mean in the message-only group, £(124) = 1.64, p < .11, and £(115) = 1.69, p < .10, respectively. It is noteworthy that reactance cues were involved in both of these cases, and it may be that such cues cause subjects to become more personally involved or interested in the message topic. Indeed, 2 of the items included in the immediate posttest questionnaire as "fillers" revealed that subjects in each reactance cue group reported greater interest and involvement in the message than subjects in the message-only group (all ps<.05). It seems possible, therefore, that increased interest and involvement may lead to crossover sleeper effects that are not predicted by the discounting cue hypothesis. It is unlikely, however, that enhanced interest and involvement could explain all the absolute sleeper effects found in these experiments, because (a) a statistically significant absolute sleeper effect was found in the Low Credibility Level 2 group, although these subjects did not report greater interest and involvement than those in the message-only group; (b) there was no sleeper effect in the Low Credibility Level 1 group, although these subjects did tend to report greater interest and involvement than those in the message-only group (p < .10); and (c) looking back at questionnaire filler items from Experiment 1, we found that subjects in the discounting cue group who read the 4-day work week message showed an absolute sleeper effect but did not report greater interest and involvement than subjects in the message-only group (in fact, the means were in the opposite direction). Thus, although enhanced interest and involvement may facilitate processes that lead to crossover effects, they cannot explain all of the sleeper effects that were obtained here.
The above discussion suggests the implausibility of the alternative interpretations we have identified. This strengthens confidence in the discounting cue hypothesis as the most likely explanation of the obtained absolute sleeper effects.
Robustness and Ecological Validity of the Effect
Although our data suggest that the sleeper effect is robust in the sense that it was repeatedly observed when all the theoretically derived conditions were met, we cannot judge the robustness of the sleeper effect in terms of its ecological validity. We do not know the extent to which the necessary conditions for it occur outside the laboratory. It can be argued that the relevant conditions do not occur often because their occurrence depends on making independent forces that are usually not independent in nature. For example, powerful messages are usually difficult to discount and require powerful discounting cues to reduce their initial impact on attitudes. But powerful cues may dissociate more slowly, which could decrease the likelihood that there will be any residual impact of the message after dissociation. On the other hand, weak messages may be discounted with weaker cues that dissociate more rapidly. Such weak messages, however, are less likely to produce significant initial attitude change and significant persistence, even over the very short term. We do not yet know whether these forces are related in the ways mentioned above, and so any statements about the ecological validity of the sleeper effect, which we have repeatedly demonstrated in the laboratory, must rest on speculation.
Conclusion
The present experiments suggest that absolute sleeper effects can be found when (a) a persuasive message has a substantial initial impact on attitudes; (b) this change is totally inhibited by a discounting cue; (c) the cue and message are dissociated over time; and (d) the cue and message are dissociated quickly enough so that the message by itself still has some impact when dissociation occurs.
The findings reported in the present research suggest that we can now answer Gillig and Greenwald's (1974) rhetorical question "Is it time to lay the sleeper effect to rest?" The answer is "Probably not," since we repeatedly found sleeper effects where the necessary and facilitating conditions were demonstrably met, and just as important, we did not find them where these conditions were not met. Gillig and Greenwald (1974) concluded that "if the sleeper effect is alive, we do not know where it is living" (p. 139). We have located it, and must therefore believe that "laying the sleeper effect to rest" at this time would constitute a premature burial.
